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Human Rights as Individualistically Justified: A Defence 
 
Rowan Cruft, University of Stirling 
 
In this chapter, I assume that human rights animate and underlie human rights 
practice, rather than being defined or created by it.  If this is correct, then what 
exactly are human rights so conceived?  Some take them to be moral rights protecting 
particular substantive values distinctive of our humanity, such as agency or human 
needs or basic human interests.  Others take them to be moral rights with a distinctive 
political function, such as rights whose violation legitimates external intervention 
within a sovereign state.  In this essay, I develop an alternative suggestion: human 
rights are distinctive because they are individualistically justified.  That is, a given 
human being’s human rights are – unlike her other moral rights – grounded primarily 
by what they do for her independently of whether they serve others.  I propose this as 
at least a necessary condition for something’s being a human right in the relevant pre-
conventional sense, and I defend the view against criticisms.  I see my account as an 
improvement on and replacement for claims that some particular value (e.g. agency) 
is ‘the’ substantive human value that human rights protect. 
 
 
(I)1 
 
In recent work, Joseph Raz has adopted a political conception according to which a 
central, defining function of human rights is to set limits to state sovereignty, limits 
that require states to ‘account for their compliance with human rights to international 
tribunals where the jurisdictional conditions are in place, and to responsibly acting 
people and organisations outside the state’.2  Part of Raz’s motivation for this political 
conception is dissatisfaction with the view that takes ‘human rights’ to be a secular 
way of referring to what would once have been called ‘natural rights’: those 
important moral rights that people hold simply in virtue of being human.  Of course, 
this ‘natural rights’ conception might – like Raz’s political conception – make human 
rights matters of international concern, but this will be a derivative rather than an 
essential feature of them qua human rights. 
 
Raz writes that human rights are ‘thought to combine exceptional importance and 
universality.  Even though various writers have offered explanations of the first 
element, that of importance, none seems to me successful’.3  A successful explanation 
here would make a special kind of importance the distinctive feature of human rights, 
thereby bypassing the need to distinguish them by their (purported) special political 
role.  As noted in my introduction, the explanations of human rights’ importance on 
offer tend to make them distinctive as protectors of particular important substantive 
values – personhood, needs, freedoms.4  I share Raz’s concern about these accounts.  
It seems doubtful that anything can be both narrow enough to qualify as a genuinely 
distinct substantive value (‘the’ value that human rights protect) yet still broad 
enough to encompass all the things we want to call human rights.5 
                                                 
1 This section draws on Cruft 2013, pp. 129-133. 
2 Raz 2010, 42.  Compare the different ‘political’ conceptions of human rights in Beitz 2009; Cohen 
2006; Pogge 2002; Rawls 1999. 
3 Raz 2010, 39. 
4 Griffin 2008; Miller 2007, Ch. 7; Wiggins 1987, Ch. 1; Sen 2004. 
5 For a pluralist approach which allows that various values can ground human rights when they are 
appropriately ‘important’, see Tasioulas 2002 and 2014. 
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But Raz fails to notice that his own account of rights in general is better taken as a 
theory of the narrower category, human rights, a theory that gives human rights a 
special kind of importance which renders unnecessary a further political account of 
human rights’ distinctiveness.  Raz’s celebrated general account of rights is as 
follows: 
 
“X has a right” if and only if X can have rights and, other things being equal, an aspect of X’s 
well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a 
duty.6 
 
According to this account, all rights are individualistically justified, where this means 
that any given right is justified primarily by what it does for its holder, considered 
independently of whether it serves or disserves people other than its holder.  To put 
this more precisely, a person P’s right R is individualistically justified if and only if: 
1. Some genuine feature F of P is of sufficient non-instrumental importance to 
constitute a powerful (i.e. hard to defeat) ground for P’s holding a right that 
will protect, serve or in some other way ensure respect for F – and R is such a 
right. 
2. This ground is undefeated and hence R is justified.7 
On Raz’s account, the relevant individualistic right-justifying feature F will always be 
some interest of the individual right-holder.  Alternative individualistic approaches 
make each right justified by how it serves its holder’s autonomy or needs, or by how 
it embodies its holder’s self-ownership or status.8 
 
Individualistic approaches are too narrow to work as general accounts of rights.  They 
fail to explain the many cases in which a right’s existence depends wholly or 
primarily on something other than the importance of some aspect of the right-holder.  
Trivial property rights (e.g. my property rights over my pen) are a good counter-
example: such rights are clearly morally justified, but they are surely not justified 
primarily by what they do for their individual holders, whether this is conceived in 
terms of interests, autonomy or status.  I have argued elsewhere that most of an 
individual’s justified property rights are justified because the property system of 
which they are a part serves the common good.9  Individualistic accounts exclude this 
plausible possibility.  This is just one type of counterexample, but a survey of our 
morally justified rights suggests that many are justified on non-individualistic 
grounds, including the importance of the development of knowledge for its own sake 
(e.g. a scientist’s right to pursue research whose results could threaten cherished 
religious beliefs), the common good (e.g. the system of rights created by traffic 
regulations), the value of beauty (e.g. your right that I not interrupt your musical 
performance). 
 
Raz thinks he can accommodate these counter-examples.  He considers a journalist’s 
right to withhold the names of her sources.  Raz suggests that this right cannot be 
justified solely by how it serves the interests of its holder (an individual journalist), 
but must instead be justified largely by how it serves the common good.  To 
accommodate this example, Raz allows that a person can qualify as a right-holder 
                                                 
6 Raz 1986, 166. 
7 This draws on my Cruft 2006, 154-158.  For further exposition, see Cruft 2013 forthcoming. 
8 The following theorists are all plausibly read as offering individualistic accounts of rights, although 
they differ over the particular feature of the individual (e.g. freedom, interests, needs) that grounds 
rights, and how exactly the grounding works: Hart 1955; Kamm 2007, Section II; Miller 2007, Ch. 7; 
Nagel 2002, Ch. 3; Pogge 2002; Sreenivasan 2010. 
9 Cruft 2006. 
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even when that person’s interests only justify duties because serving these interests in 
this way also serves other people’s interests.  Thus Raz maintains that the journalist 
has a right not to reveal her sources because (as required by his theory) the journalist's 
interests justify a duty.  Yet he maintains that the journalist’s interests only justify this 
duty because serving them also serves the common good.10  While Raz presents this 
as a way to interpret his theory it is actually an admission of defeat for, as Kamm 
notes, ‘[i]f the satisfaction of the interests of others is the reason why the journalist 
gets a right to have his interest protected, his interest is not sufficient to give rise to 
the duty of non-interference with his speech’.11  
 
In my view, the individualistic account is most attractive when applied to those basic 
rights a person has simply in virtue of being human.  For example, my right not to be 
dismembered is plausibly individualistically justified.  It is natural to regard my 
bodily integrity as a feature of me that is of sufficient non-instrumental importance on 
its own – independently of whether this serves people other than me – to constitute a 
powerful ground for rights protecting it, including a right not to be dismembered.  
The other basic rights that protect our most important features are similarly plausibly 
individualistically justified.  Why not, then, take individualistic justification as the 
hallmark of human rights?  This would furnish us with a conception of human rights 
within the ‘natural rights’ tradition, but one that defines them by the distinctively 
individualistic structure of their justification, rather than by some distinctive value 
(personhood, needs, freedom) that they all purportedly serve.  On this account, a right 
will qualify as a human right whenever it is justified primarily by what it ‘does for’ its 
holder considered independently of whether it serves or disserves others.  This ‘doing 
something for’ the holder might involve serving the holder’s interests, or protecting 
her needs, or securing her freedom, or reflecting her status etc.  So long as the right’s 
justification is individualistic, it will be a human right whatever the particular values 
at work in the justification. 
 
The individualistic approach to human rights is very attractive: as well as avoiding 
the difficulty of finding some single substantive value that all human rights serve, it 
gives centre stage to the common concern that non-individualistic theories of human 
rights are inadequate.  For example, according to welfarist consequentialism, if the 
long run collective interest would be best promoted by denying human rights to 
certain people, then there would be no justification for the existence of human rights 
for the relevant people.  Concern about this counter-intuitive implication is, in part, 
what motivates John Rawls's famous claim that ‘[u]tilitarianism does not take 
seriously the distinction between persons’.12  If human rights are individualistically 
justified then they offer the special protection grounded in respect for each separate 
person that Rawls identifies as necessary – while other rights need not, and might be 
justified on consequentialist or other non-individualistic grounds.  Some might think 
that human rights’ character as rights is sufficient to mark them as moral norms that 
respect ‘the distinction between persons’, but this is incorrect.  Rights can be borne by 
aggregates and by corporate entities.  They can also – as my example of property 
shows – play a moral role defined not by what they do for the right-holder, but by 
what they do for other values such as the common good.  By contrast a right which is 
individualistically justified is a moral claim whose grounding point is to protect a 
particular individual person. 
                                                 
10 Raz 1986, 179.  See also Raz 1994, 49-55. 
11 Kamm 2002, 485.  For Raz’s commitment to the sufficiency of the right-holder’s interests for 
grounding a duty, see Raz’s original definition of rights at Raz 1986, 166 and also ibid., 183-4.  
12 Rawls 1971, 27. 
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In addition, I have argued elsewhere that if human rights are individualistically 
justified, then this can explain and accommodate some of the appeal of the fairly 
common thesis that human rights are not always rights in the strict Hohfeldian sense, 
that is, they do not always entail duties owed to the right-holder (‘directed’ duties).  
For example, James Nickel writes: 
 
‘One approach that should be avoided puts a lot of weight on whether the norm in question 
really is, or could be, a right in a strict sense.[…] This approach begs the question of whether 
human rights are rights in a strict sense rather than a fairly loose one. The human rights 
movement and its purposes are not well served by being forced into a narrow conceptual 
framework.’13 
 
According to Nickel’s suggestion, some – but not all – human rights are best 
conceived not as rights but as goals or important values or some other non-right 
consideration.  This thesis can seem compelling if one thinks that human rights 
primarily govern a state’s relationship with its citizens, if one believes that there are 
‘positive’ human rights to goods and services including education and housing, for 
example, and if one also thinks that it is overly demanding to regard impoverished 
states as owing duties to each and every one of their citizens to educate or house 
them.14 
 
Whether or not one endorses this denial that all human rights are rights – and I am 
unsure myself15 – if human rights are distinctively individualistically justified, then it 
would probably be no surprise if language users had begun to extend the concept 
‘human rights’ to encompass other normative phenomena that were individualistically 
justified but not rights in the strict Hohfeldian sense.  Hohfeldian claim-rights 
foreground the right-holder in the reasoning of the bearer of the correlative duty: the 
right-holder is foregrounded as the person to whom the correlative duty is owed.16  
Individualistic justification offers an alternative form of foregrounding.  Any 
normative factor that is individualistically justified will involve the foregrounding of 
a particular person: the P whose F is the powerful justifying source of the relevant 
normative factor.  Suppose that we call ‘a human right’ any normative factor that is 
individualistically justified, including factors that do not involve directed duties owed 
to people and hence are not Hohfeldian rights.  Sometimes, on this approach, a human 
right will entail merely that certain goals ought to be pursued, and failure to pursue 
such goals will not qualify as a ‘violation’ of a Hohfeldian directed duty but simply as 
a failure to do all that one ought – or perhaps even simply as a failure to respond to all 
the reasons bearing on one.  But even then, because of the individualistic justification 
for the goals, there will necessarily be a sense that a particular person has been let 
down by such failure: the person whose F is the justifying source of the ‘ought’ or 
reason.  So the individualistic approach generates a form of ‘directedness’ or 
                                                 
13 Nickel 2010.  Compare Wellman 2011, 71-3. 
14 Nickel writes: ‘Treating very demanding rights as goals has several advantages.  One is that 
proposed goals that exceed one’s abilities are not as farcical as proposed duties that exceed one’s 
abilities.  Creating grand lists of human rights that many countries cannot at present realize seems 
fraudulent to many people, and perhaps this fraudulence is reduced if we understand that these “rights” 
are really goals that countries should pursue’ (Nickel 2010). 
15 I am unsure both about whether human rights should be seen as primarily borne against one’s state, 
and about whether any actual state governing any sizeable group of people could be so impoverished 
that demanding an education and housing from it would be ‘fraudulently’ over-demanding.  For some 
facts arguably supporting the ‘fraudulence’ claim, see Sreenivasan’s discussion of health spending in 
Mozambique (2012, 246). 
16 Hohfeld 1964.  For an analysis of the precise nature of this foregrounding, see Wenar 2013 and Cruft 
2013. 
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foregrounding that gives human-right-holders special status even without the 
Hohfeldian structure involving directed duties – and hence even when it does not 
involve genuine Hohfeldian rights.17 
 
 
(II) 
 
Despite these attractions – the centrality it gives to the ‘separateness of persons’, and 
the breadth of considerations it allows to qualify as human rights including non-
Hohfeldian ‘rights’ entailing mere goals or values – the individualistic approach has 
at least four apparent limitations.  First, it appears to underplay the importance of the 
burdens human rights impose on those who have to fulfil them.  Secondly, it seems to 
rule out the possibility of human rights to the provision of public goods.  Third, it 
threatens the universality of human rights.  And fourthly, it seems to include as 
human rights a range of ‘private’ goods (such as my right to my spouse’s fidelity) 
which should be excluded.  In this section, I address the first two concerns, turning to 
the second two in §(III).   
 
The first criticism maintains that human rights cannot be individualistically justified 
because (almost?) any right is grounded only if it does not impose excessive burdens 
on others.  So no right can be wholly individualistically justified.  This is correct but 
is accommodated by my precise characterisation of individualistic justification.  On 
my account, a right is individualistically justified when some feature of the right-
holder is a powerful undefeated ground for it.  ‘Powerful’ here means rarely 
defeasible.  There might perhaps be some rights whose grounds are indefeasible: 
perhaps my interest in not being tortured is of sufficient non-instrumental importance 
to constitute an indefeasible ground for your duty not to torture me, a ground 
sufficient to make this duty exist wholly independently of whether it serves anyone 
other than me.  But most rights are not grounded in this way.  For most rights, if their 
existence would be extremely costly, their grounds are defeated.  My account of 
individualistic justification is intended to accommodate many such rights.  For 
example, my being able to take part in public debate is, I suggest, sufficiently 
important to constitute a rarely defeasible ground for others’ duties to let me take 
part.  Only major countervailing considerations can defeat the ground for these duties.  
But in extreme circumstances, perhaps it could be defeated.  The account of 
individualistic justification leaves open the possibility that the burdens on duty-
bearers, or indeed other considerations (perhaps the burdens on third parties) could 
defeat the grounding.18   
 
Note however that on my account, a right is not individualistically justified whenever 
some feature of the right-holder contributes something (no matter how small) to its 
grounding – for example, if the right-holder’s interests figure along with many others 
on the ‘in favour of R’ side of a utilitarian calculus that comes out supporting right 
R.19  To be individualistically justified, a right must be grounded by a feature of the 
right-holder that plays a powerful role in its grounding.  But my notion of 
‘powerfulness’ is designed to allow that even individualistically justified rights will 
                                                 
17 See Cruft 2012 for a full development of the argument summarised here. 
18 Note that the discussion in the main text concerns the grounds determining whether a right exists or 
not, rather than the grounds for infringing it when it does exist.  The latter issue is the stringency of the 
right; the former – my concern – is the stringency of its grounds.   
19 For discussion of whether Raz could be read as endorsing even such utilitarian account as fulfilling 
his individualistic view of rights, see Cruft 2013. 
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normally be successfully grounded only when they do not impose enormous burdens 
on others.  What counts as a relevant burden – e.g. whether the cost (or indeed 
feasibility) of fulfilling a candidate right in conjunction with other similar rights is a 
relevant burden that could defeat a given right’s grounding – is something I leave for 
further work.20  The key point is that individualistic grounds are not defined as 
indefeasible, but only as powerful. 
 
A second concern claims that the individualistic approach cannot accommodate 
human rights that enjoin the provision of public goods, such as human rights to 
adequate sanitation.21  A simplistic version of this worry takes individualistic 
justification to exclude any rights grounded in humans’ sociality.  The individualistic 
approach does not make this mistake.  It allows that many features of the individual 
which are of relevantly powerful right-justifying importance will involve or be 
constituted by our social nature.  For example, having a say in one’s community’s 
decisions is – whether construed as an interest, a freedom or a need – of very great 
importance for (almost?) any individual person, importance sufficient to make it a 
powerful right-justifying feature of that individual person: a feature that 
individualistically grounds that person’s right to political participation.  Natural rights 
theories that appeal only to the interests of persons in a ‘state of nature’ struggle to 
accommodate rights of this type, but my individualistic structure allows that features 
that a person holds only because they live in society can nonetheless be of 
individualistic right-justifying importance.22 
 
Still, one might worry that some human rights require the provision of public goods, 
and that no individual’s interests or other features can be sufficient on their own to 
constitute a powerful ground for creating the extensive social and physical 
infrastructure necessary to deliver public goods.  The thought is that only in 
conjunction with the needs of others do we get a powerful case for creating such an 
infrastructure.  For example, we cannot – at least with contemporary scarcities – 
justify building a hospital simply to save your grandfather, or a water treatment plant 
simply to supply your child.  Or, to use Sreenivasan’s example, we cannot justify 
vaccinating a whole population simply to protect you from measles.23  The 
importance of the individual right-holder cannot play a ‘powerful’ role (in my terms) 
in justifying the provision of the relevant public good. 
 
I introduced these thoughts as a potential problem for the individualistic approach to 
human rights, but I doubt it is one.  Do we really want to say that your grandfather’s 
human right to medical care includes a right to the building of a hospital?  Or that 
your child’s human right to clean water includes a right to the creation of a treatment 
plant?  Or that your human right to health care includes a right that the whole 
population be vaccinated?  It is unintuitive to regard an individual’s human rights as 
including rights to such large public goods. As Sreenivasan puts it, ‘no individual can 
have a moral claim-right to any pure public good’.24   
 
                                                 
20 See Waldron 1989, Eddy 2006, Miller 2012, Tasioulas 2014. 
21 Thanks to James Nickel and Katrin Flikschuh for pressing this point.  
22 I suggest that similar reasoning can ground most of the human rights to equal treatment that 
Buchanan sees as problematic for approaches like Griffin’s (Buchanan 2010). 
23 Sreenivasan 2012, 256. 
24 Ibid.  See Sreenivasan’s instructive explanation for why Raz’s individualistic account of rights in 
general cannot deliver any individual rights to public goods (ibid., 257-8). 
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A defence of the individualistic approach against the public goods problem could end 
there: as there are no human rights to public goods, there is no problem.  Yet at the 
same time I think we do want to say that a government which diverts resources away 
from basic health care or sanitation in order to fund the secret police (or even, I would 
add, in order to fund some worthy non-human-rights cause such as an arts centre) 
raises human rights concerns.  Public goods look like they can be a human rights 
issue.  We might even want to say that the government in this example violates its 
citizens’ human rights.  How can we make sense of the combination of this position 
with Sreenivasan’s plausible claim that a person can have no right, on their own, to 
the provision of a public good?  Can a position which accommodates both thoughts 
leave space for my individualistic approach to human rights? 
 
One way to accommodate these thoughts is the route outlined at the end of §(I) 
above: we could abandon the Hohfeldian model of human rights, and allow that your 
human right to health protection includes some individualistically justified 
governmental goals or reasons which are not duties owed to you.  In particular, we 
could say that your interest in health is so important that it is a powerful ground for 
the government’s taking your health to be something it has strong reason to promote.  
And many other people’s interests in health – your grandfather’s, your neighbour’s 
and so on – also each individualistically ground the government’s taking their health 
to be something it has strong reason to promote.  As all these strong reasons are 
efficiently served by a vaccination programme creating herd immunity, failure to 
pursue this programme fails to respond each one of these individualistically grounded 
reasons for government action.  It is thus a failure to respond appropriately to each 
individual’s important reason-grounding features.  Although this is not a violation of 
any duty owed to each right-holder, it is nonetheless in some sense a case of 
‘directed’ disrespect: disrespect shown to each individual whose interests were 
sufficiently important on their own to ground reasons for the government.25 
 
Yet a more Hohfeldian approach still seems attractive, for non-provision of the 
vaccination programme looks rather like a violation.  We could retain this thought by 
finding a collective right-holder, such as ‘all citizens’, to whom the duty of 
vaccination is owed.  But this introduces new problems26 and departs from the spirit 
of my individualistic approach.  Furthermore, when people protest at human rights 
violations in these areas, there is a sense that protesters think each individual citizen 
has been wronged individually.  Perhaps the best approach for making sense of this 
within my individualistic framework maintains that in this sort of case a feature of a 
person (such as their interest in health protection) which individualistically grounds 
some human rights (such as a right to postnatal care) also non-individualistically 
grounds a government duty – rather than simply a set of goals or strong reasons – to 
produce some public good (e.g. to develop a vaccination programme).  That is, the 
relevant right-grounding feature of a given individual generates this duty when taken 
alongside the same feature in everyone else (e.g. everyone else’s interest in health 
protection).  This non-individualistically justified duty to provide the particular public 
good cannot be taken to correlate with any individual’s human right on a strict 
reading of my individualistic conception.  But I suggest that so long as this duty is 
grounded primarily in the importance of a set of features which also succeed in 
individualistically grounding human rights (in my precise individualistic sense), then 
we can see the duty to produce the public good as derived from the very same source 
                                                 
25 Note that this paragraph could be re-run in terms other than interests. 
26 For example, how is the collective identified?  
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as human rights.  Hence we can see its violation as in some sense a human rights 
violation, violating each of the people whose features ground it.  The duty in question 
– to produce the public good – is not itself individualistically grounded, but it is 
grounded by features of many people, and each of these features is on its own an 
individualistic source of some other human rights. 
 
Thus, for example, my interest in health protection grounds some rights in an 
unproblematically individualistic way, such as my right that the government not 
deliberately infect me with a disease (e.g. for research purposes, or as a form of 
population control).  The idea is that in conjunction with a similar interest in others, 
my interest grounds a government duty to set up a vaccination programme to create 
herd immunity.  Even though this duty is not individualistically justified, it is 
grounded in interests each of which also individualistically justify some human 
rights, and this licenses our regarding the non-individualistically justified duty as a 
‘human right’ in an extended sense, a right whose violation wrongs those whose 
interests non-individualistically ground it.27 
 
This suggestion requires further elaboration, but I will here record my optimism about 
the prospects for the individualistic approach.  It correctly delivers the conclusion that 
there will very rarely, if ever, be any human rights that, considered as the rights of 
one person alone, require the creation of public goods.  But I think it does not exclude 
the possibility that where the conjunction of many people’s human-right-grounding 
features would best be served by the creation of such goods, then there is a duty to 
create them which is owed to each of those whose right-grounding features, taken 
together, ground this duty – a duty that while not individualistically justified, is 
justified on grounds that do other work as individualistic sources of further duties. 
 
 
(III) 
 
A third concern is that the individualistic approach is inconsistent with human rights’ 
universality.28  Might some aspects of life, such as religious worship, be of powerful 
right-grounding importance for some individuals and not others?  If so, some will 
hold rights to religious worship as human rights and others will not (these others 
might hold no such right, or might hold a right to worship that failed to qualify as a 
human right).  This would be incompatible with human rights’ universality.  Some 
theorists question human rights’ universality across time, but almost everyone wants 
to see human rights as borne universally by all humans living now.29 
 
One confident response to this concern holds that the only features of each human 
that possess genuinely powerful right-justifying importance are features borne 
universally by each.  I can see some promise in this suggestion: could any interest, 
say, really be of sufficient importance to constitute a powerful case for a right for me, 
without the same interest constituting such a case for a right for you?  But to make 
                                                 
27 Note that Wenar’s account of what it is for a duty to be owed to someone would allow the non-
individualistically justified duty in this case to be owed to each and every individual, for each 
individual wants, qua subject of vaccination, to be vaccinated (Wenar 2013).  So the problem for the 
individualistic approach is not with the direction of the duty, but rather with whether it can be 
individualistically justified.  I have argued that it can, but in the extended sense outlined. 
28 Thanks to James Nickel for pressing this.  For an earlier approach to this problem, in which I try out 
the notion that human rights are non-universal, see Cruft 2005.  I now see this as involving too radical a 
departure from the accepted concept of human rights. 
29 Tasioulas 2002, Raz 2010. 
 10 
good on this, we need some universal conception of the important right-justifying 
features of people, and I am concerned that such a conception is hard to develop 
without either ethnocentric bias (e.g. it might erroneously assume that choosing one’s 
career is important for everyone) or unhelpful generalness (e.g. it might maintain only 
that ‘some freedom’ and ‘some wellbeing’ are of powerful right-justifying importance 
for everyone).30   
 
The alternative is to maintain that only members of that subset of powerful right-
justifying features which really are borne universally generate human rights.31  Notice 
that this approach allows that there might well be some individualistically justified 
rights which are just as important as human rights (i.e. based on equally powerful 
grounds), but which do not qualify for this title because they are not grounded in 
universally borne right-justifying features.  Recognising this point should foster 
implementation of human rights that is highly sensitive to cultural diversity and to 
individual intra-cultural diversity.  For if, as a human rights practitioner, I know that 
there might be idiosyncratic moral rights around that are individualistically grounded 
in the same way as human rights, but that are borne only by some people, in virtue of 
their possessing powerful right-justifying features that other humans lack, then this 
will generate an appropriate epistemic humility in my implementation of human 
rights.  This will not be epistemic humility concerning the universality or content of 
human rights – for we have made human rights universal by definition on this 
approach, their content determined by those powerful right-justifying features that are 
genuinely borne universally – but rather humility concerning the relative importance 
of human rights vis-à-vis idiosyncratic rights borne only by some.32 
 
If the suggestion just mentioned sounds odd, it is worth adding that many other 
approaches to human rights will have a similar implication: they will allow for the 
existence of some rights which are morally as important as human rights but which do 
not qualify for this title.  Griffin makes clear that his approach has this implication.  
He argues that human rights on his account – rights protecting our normative agency 
– are just one branch of justice, and that some very serious rights such as ‘the right to 
compensation following a miscarriage of justice’ will not qualify as proper human 
rights, even though they are as important as rights which do qualify.33  Pogge’s 
position is similar: he insists that a murder committed by a person in a ‘private’ 
capacity will not itself be a human rights violation, whereas one committed by a 
government hit squad will be; but we should not therefore conclude that government-
sanctioned killing is necessarily morally worse than ‘private’ killing.34  It is 
interesting to investigate whether other ‘political’ approaches to human rights have a 
similar consequence.  In particular, are there some rights whose violation is rightly a 
‘private’ matter but that are morally as important as rights whose violation legitimates 
wars of humanitarian intervention?  If so, then even a strongly ‘political’ account of 
                                                 
30 For development of these worries, see Cruft 2014. 
31 This seems to be Tasioulas’s approach.  He takes human rights to be grounded not in whatever basic 
interests a person holds, but in those which are borne universally.  Tasioulas faces the same challenge 
as me about the universality of human rights because, by developing an account of human rights based 
on Raz’s general conception of rights, he assumes that human rights – along with all other rights – are 
individualistically justified (2002, 2012, 2014; the individualistic character of his approach is 
highlighted especially in 2012, 29-31).  
32 This is, of course, not to maintain that just any old claimed idiosyncratic important right will really 
be individualistically justified.  Many will not (e.g. particular property rights) or will lack any 
justification whatsoever (e.g. purported rights to superior positions in virtue of one’s caste). 
33 Griffin 2008, 199. 
34 Pogge 2002, 57-63. 
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human rights like Rawls’s would have the same consequence as my individualistic 
approach: it would allow that some moral rights could be as important as human 
rights – taking the same priority in the agent’s reasoning – but fail to qualify as 
human rights on conceptual grounds. 
 
This leads neatly to the fourth charge faced by the individualistic approach, a charge 
which, like the third, accuses the approach of describing too many rights as human 
rights.  Even when we focus only on universal individualistically justified rights, we 
seem to find too many.  One’s right not to be murdered, one’s right not to be lied to 
by one’s friends, one’s right to a say in important family decisions all look 
individualistically justified.  Each of these things – my not being murdered, lied to, 
excluded from family decisions – seems sufficiently important to generate powerful 
individualistic grounds for rights.  Do we want to say that these rights are human 
rights?  Isn’t the right not to be murdered a serious moral and criminal matter but – so 
long as it is not state-sponsored or state-sanctioned murder – not a human right?  
Aren’t the rights not to be lied to or excluded from one’s family private matters of 
right, rather than human rights?35 
  
Here I think the theorist faces a difficult choice.  Many writers – including Gewirth, 
Sen, Tasioulas and Wellman – are willing to allow that human rights encompass a 
range of very important rights including ‘personal’ ones such as the right to a say in 
key family decisions, or the right not to be lied to by one’s friends.36  If this seems too 
inclusive, then we could add that human rights are distinguished not only as 
individualistically justified and universal, but also as rights that are ‘everybody’s 
business’ – not in the sense that they must entail duties for everyone, for the human 
right to free speech for example seems primarily to entail duties for governments and 
organisations, and not for ‘ordinary individuals’.37  Rather, the suggestion is that 
human rights are distinguished as the rights respect for which can be legitimately 
demanded on the right-holder’s behalf by anyone anywhere.38 
 
This might still seem too inclusive because many of the most important individual 
moral rights that are standardly protected by the criminal law (such as my rights not 
to be murdered or assaulted) are individualistically justified, universally borne, and 
demandable by anyone on the right-holder’s behalf – but the conventions of 
international law, and many thinkers working on human rights, deny that such 
ordinary individual criminal law rights are human rights.39  To narrow the concept 
further one could add that human rights are not only (i) individualistically justified 
and universal and (ii) demandable by anyone anywhere but also (iii) rights whose 
violation can trigger legitimate international intervention.  This would be to add a 
strong Rawlsian version of the ‘political’ conception of human rights to my proposed 
individualistic justificatory one.40 
                                                 
35 This section draws on Cruft 2012, 134-6. 
36 The first example is drawn from Sen 1999, 229, the second from Gewirth 1982, 56; see also 
Wellman 2011, 36-39 and Tasioulas 2012, 40. 
37 For the view that human rights must entail duties for all others, see, e.g., Wellman 2011, 26. 
38 I am tempted by John Skorupski’s suggestion that ‘to demand’ in this context means to make a 
request backed by a permissibly enforceable threat – where this force could be merely social and hence 
need not involve the type of international military intervention that would make the position outlined 
here collapse into the ‘political’ position that I am about to introduce in the next paragraph of the main 
text (Skorupski 2010, 310). 
39 See, e.g., Pogge 2002, Ch. 2. 
40 Weaker versions of the ‘political’ account – such as that (iv) support for, condoning, or maybe even 
simply allowing violation of human rights is sufficient to undermine a state’s legitimacy, or to render 
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In my view, linguistic usage underdetermines one's choice between the three ways of 
conceiving human rights sketched above.  Quite frequently one encounters ‘human 
rights’ used to refer to any universal important rights - and this importance, I think, is 
best accounted for in terms of individualistic justification.  But one also encounters 
the thesis that human rights cannot be too ‘private’ in the way Gewirth, Sen, 
Tasioulas and Wellman allow; instead, a particular human rights violation must be 
everyone's business.  And the recent growth of ‘political’ conceptions of human rights 
reflects a very significant strand in current human rights discourse.41   
 
It is not clear to me that a resolution is needed in this area.  Whether human rights 
should be construed as ‘political’, ‘everyone’s business’, or simply the important 
moral rights held by humans depends, I think, on one’s purposes, audiences and 
philosophical methodology.  All I want to show is that individualistic justification is 
one of the defining features of human rights, a feature that does a better job of 
capturing what is distinctive of human rights as natural moral rights than approaches 
which select a particular human value – agency, needs and so on – and claim that 
human rights specifically protect that.  I must confess that I am doubtful that a 
political function in terms of international intervention is a further defining feature.  
Taking this as essential to human rights makes their existence too contingent on the 
existence of a system of nations, on intervention being a genuine possibility etc.; and 
it risks overly narrowing the set of human rights.  But I will not pursue this here.  My 
aim has been rather to argue that individualistic justification is one of the defining 
features of human rights; this offers a plausible secular way of thinking about human 
rights as forms of ‘natural right’, a way that makes sense of the distinctive importance 
of human rights without tying them to any particular grounding value.  It does not 
rule out supplementary defining features of types (ii) and (iii) – nor indeed a 
requirement of universality as noted earlier in this section. 
 
 
(IV) 
 
On my individualistic account, human rights embody or reflect the fact that each 
individual is, on her own, a powerful source of demanding moral claims: claims on 
her government, on other governments and – if we go beyond the ‘political’ approach 
mentioned above – on other individuals and groups.  Other moral structures such as 
an undirected duty to promote the good, or the requirements of virtue, do not directly 
depend on a particular individual’s importance in the way that human rights do.  My 
examples of non-individualistically justified rights in §(I), such as property rights or 
the rights of scientific researchers, show that even moral structures which prioritise a 
particular individual in the agent’s reasoning (that is, rights and directed duties) need 
not be grounded in the importance of that individual.  My proposal has been that the 
concept human rights denotes structures so grounded.  In my view, this approach is 
                                                                                                                                            
certain weak forms of intervention justified – do not so obviously help exclude all the moral rights 
recognised by criminal law from qualifying as human rights.  For it is not implausible to say that the 
more a state supports, condones or allows common assaults, rape, murder, fraud and theft, the less 
legitimate it is, and the more justified weak international intervention (e.g. official reprimands) can be. 
41 See especially Charles Beitz’s argument that the ‘political’ account best reflects the actual ‘practice’ 
of human rights (Beitz 2009).  
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more fruitful than the search for a particular substantive value that human rights 
protect.42 
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